Mothering and intelligence in Aristotle’s Biology and Ethics by Connell, Sophia Margaret
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Connell, Sophia Margaret Mothering and intelligence in Aristotle’s Biology








Dr Sophia Connell  
Mothering and Intelligence in Aristotle’s Biology and Ethics 
K1 
In much modern moral philosophy, parenting, and particularly mothering, is taken to be 
natural and so downgraded as unthinking.  The feminist ethicist Virginia Held, for example, 
argues that moral philosophy ignores the importance of mother-child relationships as a 
paradigm for morality. In her view, dominant theories regard mothering as animalistic, 
instinctive and unthoughtful.
1
 Agreeing with that assessment of current attitudes in ethics, 
Sara Ruddick challenges such views, arguing that mothering is essentially an intellectual 
activity—in facing often conflicting demands for the preservation, growth and social 
acceptability of their children, mothers must “daily…think out strategies of protection, 
nurturance, and training” in order to meet these demands. Furthermore, “in quieter moments, 
mothers reflect on their practice as a whole.”
 2
 What both thinkers fail to recognise is that one 
philosophical tradition accommodates not only the practical reasoning involved in everyday 
parental decision making but also the fact that even in non-human animals, this involves 
intelligence. These positions can be found in the biological and ethical works of Aristotle.  
By combining the insights found in these works, an Aristotelian model for the ethics of 
parenting emerges which emphasises the intellectual work required to raise the next 
generation, something that is good for everyone involved. 
I divide the paper into three parts. The first section discusses Aristotle’s use of the 
term φρόνησις (practical wisdom) in his biological works where the thinking described relates 
specifically to parenting and especially mothering. I then explain what it is that goes on in 
human parenting activities and thinking which (although natural) mark them off from what 
occurs in other animals. Next I will turn to Aristotle’s ethics and his description of human 
children as friends. In the final section, I will explain the effect of the virtue of caring for 
younger friends with reference to Aristotle’s discussion of a child as a product and the parent 
as a producer. A striking feature throughout this analysis is the seldom unacknowledged 
admiration shown for the female sex in the texts of Aristotle. In both human and non-human 
animals, female parents, even more so than male ones, display superior virtues and 
intelligence of the correct sort when striving to care for and train the young.   
 
I. Intelligence and Maternal Activities in Aristotle’s Biology. 
In his ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between natural and real or proper (κυρία) virtue, the 
latter requiring the addition of practical wisdom (φρόνησις; see EN VI.13.1144b16-17).  
Natural virtues on their own can sometimes be harmful as the following passage illustrates. 
 
[In general] the horse kind seems to have by nature a parental affection (φιλόστοργος). 
Evidence of this is that often the barren mares steal the dams’ foals, and are the ones 
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Here, because the natural caring virtue is unguided by φρόνησις, it is detrimental (see EN 
VI.13.1144b10).  
 Although they lack proper virtue, non-human parents are referred to as practically 
wise (φρόνιμος) and intelligent (διάνοια) in Aristotle’s biology. The following passages 
illustrate this. 
 
Among animals that are wild and quadruped the deer is held to be an intelligent 
(φρόνιμος), not least because it gives birth alongside the roads (for the wild beasts do 
not approach because of the humans) and, after giving birth, first eats the membrane. 
Also they run for the seseli and eat it before going back to their young.
4
 Further, she 
leads the young to her lair, accustoming them to the place where they should seek 
refuge: this is precipitous rock, with a single approach, where they say the deer finally 




The female cuckoo achieves reproduction intelligently (φρόνιμος): for because it is 
conscious of its own cowardice and its inability to give help, for this reason it makes 
its own chicks substitutions by stealth, as it were, in order to save them (HA 
VIII(IX).29.618a26-29). 
 
Sometimes male animals also join in caring for the young, although Aristotle regards these 




In general, with regard to their lives (βίοι), one may observe many imitations 
(μιμήματα) of human life in the other animals…In the smaller ones, one may observe 
the precision of their intelligence (διάνοια): for example, first, in the case of the birds, 
the swallow’s nest-building.  For in the mixture of straw into mud she keeps the same 
order. She interweaves mud with the stalks; and if she lacks mud she moistens herself 
and rolls her feathers into the dust.  Further, she builds the nest just as men build, 
putting the stiff materials underneath first, and making it match herself in size.  Over 
the feeding (τροφή) of the young both birds carry out the work; they give to each, 
                                                          
3
 Trans. D. M. Balme, Aristotle. History of Animals, Books VII-X, ed. D. M. Balme (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1991). 
4
 This is a drug used to sooth post-natal disorders (Hippocrates, Acut.7). Deer are also said to have medical 
knowledge at Historia animalium VIII(IX).5.611b21-26. 
5
 When bears are in flight they push their cubs in front and pick them up and carry them; and when they are 
being overtaken they leap up into the trees.  And after coming out of the hibernation-place they first eat arum 
(see HA VIII(IX)6. 611a33-35). Cranes are also φρόνιμα because they warn each other of dangers (see HA 
VIII(IX)10). 
6
 In animals, nurturing activities are overwhelmingly feminine—so much so that when a male animal takes over, 
the words Aristotle uses to describe his care are that he “does the female tasks,” for example at Historia 
animalium VIII(IX).47.631b2-4: “On the death of a hen, a cock has been seen to undertake the female tasks, 
leading the chickens about and rearing them (ἐκτρέφοντες).” 
3 
 
watching habitually the one that has already had it, so that it should not get it twice. 
And at first they themselves throw out the dung, but when the nestlings have grown 
they teach (διδάσκουσι) them to turn around and discharge it outside (HA 
VIII(IX).7.612b18-32). 
 
The intelligence we observe in these animals includes the use of ingenious methods, requiring 
some learning and thus primitive experience (presumably based on memory).
7
 They take into 
account new information about their circumstances (as in the case of giving birth by the 
roadside) and about their own characters (as in the case of the cuckoo). Non-human animals 
are also skilled at training their young, even when faced with unforeseen situations, for 
example teaching them to respond to new threats by hiding. They can train the young to live 
better, as in the case of waste disposal in swallows. 
Humans are the “most φρόνιμος” animal, according to Aristotle (GA II.6.744a30).  In 
fact, φρόνησις does not properly apply to any other animal; when he uses the term in his 
zoology, this is most likely to be in an extended sense.
8
  What is missing in non-human 
animals is conscious deliberation and choice.  All the activities that aid the survival and 
development of the young in the above examples require intelligence but lack choice.  For 
example, although aware of her own cowardice, the female cuckoo is not in control of her 
response to this; she cannot choose to advocate the course of action taken any more than the 
mare can choose not to steal the foal.  Non-human animals cannot deliberate (see HA 
I.1.488b24) or choose (see EN III.2.1111b8-10, II.6.1106a36). This is what sets apart 
people—and also what saves Aristotle from any crude biological essentialism in his ethics of 
parenthood. 
  
II. Human Mothering 
Humans, in common with other animals, desire to reproduce themselves (see Pol. 
I.2.1252a25-29) and have inclinations to care for and train their young.  
 
It would seem that nature resolves to prepare for there being a feeling of care for the 
offspring.  This is created in inferior animals only until the birth, in others until 
development is complete and in those that are more intelligent, until they are brought 
up (ἐκτροφήν).  Those with the most share of intelligence (φρονήσεως), become 
intimate and friendly toward them after they have fully matured, as happens in the 
human kind and some tetrapods.  It occurs in birds until they have given birth and 
raised the chicks.  For this reason, the females that haven’t sat on the eggs, when they 
have lain them, fall into a worse condition, as if being deprived of one of their inborn 
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Unlike non-human animals, human beings must choose to advocate the nurturing relations 
that exist naturally. For Aristotle, the human good consists in exercising our virtues (EN 
II.2.1106b16). This activity, in turn, depends on possessing practical intelligence—
φρόνησις—the ability to judge the situation correctly and respond appropriately, weighing up 
different commitments and concerns (see EN II.2.1104a7; VI.4.1140a25-28).  It also involves 
a continual reassessment of one’s overall aims in light of one’s current decisions.
10
 Caring for 
and raising a young person, if it is to be done successfully, resulting in someone who will be 
a capable adult member of society, clearly requires this intellectual virtue. 
To gain further insight into the way in which parenting, virtue and φρόνησις are 
related, we must look to Aristotle’s account of friendship. When humans care for and train 
their young this is a sort of friendship (see EN VIII.1.1155a17-21).
11
 Loving is the virtue of 
friends, which is best exemplified in a mother’s feeling (see EN VIII.8.1159a28-35). The 
natural feelings of affection for a child are not enough to count as proper friendship; there 
also has to be an intelligent choice to engage in the friendship relation.  Added to this, the 
friendship that a carer has for the person he or she cares for also requires a sophisticated 
practical intelligence as detailed above.  For Aristotle, friendship is like virtue (see EN 
VIII.1.1155a1-6, cf. EN IX.9.1169b16-19, VIII.5.1157b21-3) and so must involve practical 
wisdom. His more intricate account of the friendship between parents and children reveal 
why this is the case. 
 The friendship between parent and child is an unequal one which means that one party 
is more virtuous than the other—in case of parent/child is such since the parent is more 
virtuous because virtue requires maturity.  In EN VIII.7 Aristotle seems to say that unequal 
friendships must be evened up by the less good party loving the better party more. 
 
In all friendships corresponding to superiority, the loving must also  be proportional, 
e.g. the better person, and the more beneficial…must be more loved than he loves;for 
when the loving reflects the comparative worth of the friends, equality is achieved in 




In EN VIII he nuances this initial thought; although “most people…wish to be loved rather 
than to love” this is based on ambition and is wrong as he goes on to explain with reference 
to mothering. 
 
[F]riendship seems to consist more in loving rather than in being loved. A sign of this 
is the enjoyment a mother finds in loving. For sometimes she gives her child awayto 
be brought up, and loves him as long as she knows about him; but she does not seek 
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the child’s love, if she cannot both [love and be loved]. She would seem to be 
satisfied if she sees the child doing well, and she loves the child even if ignorance 
prevents him from according to her what befits a mother. Friendship, then, consists 
more in loving (EN VIII.8.1159a27-34). 
 
Aristotle here abandons the crude view that friendship is like justice—in which if you give 
more, you must be paid back more in return.  Instead, it is an intrinsic good; loving more is 
actually better than being loved.  This is further evidenced by the intelligent decisions that 
have led this particular mother to send her child away.  As with all practical reasoning, this 
person has to understand the situation extremely well—both in terms of the social setting, the 
child’s personality and her own situation. She will take all these circumstances into 
consideration, along with weighing up her feelings in choosing to send the child away to be 
cared for by others (a decision that many mothers have intelligently made for millennia). 
Using her reasoning capacities, she thereby supersedes her own merely natural virtue of 
desiring to personally nurture her own child in favour of what is best.    
For Aristotle, this individual promotes her own well-being by loving in this thoughtful 
manner.  In more general terms, the friendship of an older person for a younger, immature 
person is a component of εὐδαιμονία.  He characterises younger friends as “external goods” 
(see EN I.8.1099a31-b6, VIII.12.1161b18-29, 1162a27-8) which are necessary for happiness. 
 
Deprivation of certain [external goods]—e.g. good birth, good children, beauty—mars 
our blessedness; for we do not altogether have the character of happiness if we look 
utterly repulsive or are ill-born, solitary or childless, and have it even less, 
presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad, or were good but have died (EN 
I.8.1099b2-6). 
 
A second passage notes that if our children and descendants do badly after our death, this 
might also affect our happiness.   
 
[A] dead person also, it seems, has good or evil when, e.g., he receives honours or 
dishonours, and his children, and descendants in general, do well or suffer misfortune 
(EN I.10.1100a19-23). 
 
As Scott explains, the key to understanding how children can contribute to your goodness or 




III. Aristotle on Children as Beneficiaries and Products 
The type of friendship that exists between the younger and the older is that which exists 
between benefactor and beneficiary (see EN IX.7.1167b33-1168a5; IX.8.1168b5-7).  
Benefactors love more than they are loved, and we can recall that loving is more virtuous. 
Loving is like production, while being loved is like being acted on (see EN IX.7.1168a20). 
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Each person loves their own product—and beneficiaries are their product.  A paradigm case 
is again a mother. 
 
There is the same relation between the effect and the activity, the benefited being as it 
were an effect or production of the benefactor.  Hence in animals their strong feelings 
for their offspring both in begetting them and in preserving them afterwards. And so 
fathers love the children—and still more mothers—more than they are loved by 
them…mothers love more than fathers because they think the children to be more 
their own production; for the amount of work is measured by the difficulty, and the 




As detailed in Metaphysics, only when the product reaches complete development is the 
actuality of the producer’s activity complete (see VIII.8.1050a4-b3).  Thus, it is only when 
one’s beneficiary is complete/mature that one’s activity as a benefactor is achieved.  This 
explains why whether the younger members of our kind we care for
15
 become self-sufficient 
affects our ongoing well-being and the assessment of how well our lives go after our death.
16
  
Apart from elucidating how the fate of our young friends affects our happiness, the 
passage is also about the ethical import of maternal feelings. One might understand the 
comment about the mother’s situation as dismissive of her feelings. Aristotle says that the 
mother “thinks” that the child is more her product, and this is perhaps false because she 
thinks it is all about the physical labour of giving birth (see EE VII.8.1241b9).
17
  However, 
the feelings that the mother experiences are not suspect. As he makes clear in the case of the 
mother who sends her child away, her labour is not just physical, but also emotional and 
intellectual.  Furthermore, her feelings are not merely given by nature.  Instead, she is making 
an intelligent choice to endorse these efforts, and so displays virtue. Since he begins the 
sentence referring only to male parents (see EE VII.8.1241b3), one could think that Aristotle 
would encourage fathers to be more like mothers currently are—when they endorse their 
efforts and regard their children as products of these efforts, they love them more and gain 
more virtue for themselves.  
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This account may be further elucidated through Aristotle’s craft metaphor. It is 
difficult to craft a well-functioning chair.
18
 Making a good chair is an achievement.  Similarly 
raising a child is an achievement. In addition, when the child is fully grown and able to make 
her own decisions, a parent can legitimately take pride in their good choices. A parent might 
even feel that these choices are, at least partially, due to herself—a parent can take credit.
19
  
For Aristotle the fact that a child is one’s product explains the affection one feels for 
it. If we go back to animals, we can see how human affection differs. A natural affection for 
offspring exists in mostly female animals and this serves to protect their lives.  The core 
affection in humans is not this but the result of responding correctly to their own efforts— 
giving birth to children is hard work but raising them is much harder.  The effort is for the 
production of something difficult to create and so is comparable to the intelligent choices of 
the carpenter.  Thus, the affection is not a natural urge but due to a choice—a choice to 
endorse this serious undertaking—and since in doing so, they make this enterprise their own 
project, they feel affection for the enterprise, as well as the person. The carpenter in parallel 
will love his action and his artistic achievement.  An individual chair is the product of a 
particular series of actions expressive of the carpenter’s skill, which will make it unique.  
Thus we can see how the personal input that one makes towards a young person’s 
development, as parent or mentor, can be individual—the chair must end up functional, so 
there will be certain parameters, but within these there is room for different ways to do this. 
The carpenter will have pride in having produced a functioning chair but also with having 




One might now worry that the parent here depicted is selfish. Although she would 
rather that her child do well than that she has the pleasure of its affection, ultimately by 
coming to that decision, she is making her own life go better.  In ensuring that the child fares 
well, that he grows up properly, she is achieving an important part of her own life’s work. I 
would like to suggest that this renders the Aristotelian model of parenting superior to the self-
sacrificing one.
21
 There is room in the product/producer model for self-expression, self-
authorship and authenticity, which can be considered crucial to moral character.
22
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Human drives to nurture and develop younger members of our kind have their roots in 
our shared natural setting—as animals that live in groups and as living being that are mortal 
and must reproduce.  But there are also important ways in which our efforts differ—in raising 
children, parents are benefiting themselves by identifying with their role as producer of 
another’s successful realisation.  The patterns of desire, thought and behaviour Aristotle 
details are found most obviously in mothers—but there is nothing to stop fathers and others 
joining in. Furthermore, all care for the young and vulnerable in human communities is not 
driven by affection as blind natural impulse but by the pride that people take in one of the 
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